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"(Z' ( + S&T Policy Reforms In Taiwan  Science and Technology Basic Law (1999) Subsidy Principle of Management and Promotion of Academia R&D Results (2002) Assist research institutes to establish technology transfer or liaison offices; to subsidize academic patent application and maintenance fees*uu  8."Items for Institutional Legitimacy##$"  9/ Hypothesis 1: The greater the institutional legitimacy that academic patent inventors perceive, the better their entrepreneurial performance is0Z  Resource-based view0  A broad definition of resources (Wernefelt, 1984; 1995) Organizational resources University s IPR incentive program Networking resources Researcher s relationships with other researchers, industrial partners, manufacturers, and venture capitalists Personal resources Researcher s training, experience, intelligence, and insights of the researcher8ZZ#ZZoZZPZ #o    P]  ;1<2=3>4?5@6A7C9K?recursive regression models  (  rNumber of patent grants =  +1 IPR office subsidy +2 Patenting incentive +3 Patent subsidy +4 IPR evaluation expert +5 IPR agent+6 Academic research links +7 IPR training & education + & & & & (Equation 1) Number of licenses = +1 Patent grant +2 Royalty distribution+ 3 U-I cooperative project subsidy + 4 Licensing incentive + 5 Industrial collaborative research +6 Industrial contract research+ 7 Technology transfer experience + & & & .. (Equation 2) where Patent grant is the predicted number of patent grants (from Equation 1) Number of spin-off equities = +1 Patent grant +2 License + 3 Industrial temporary transfer + 4 Campus entrepreneurial fund + 5 Incubator facility + 6 Manufacturer links+ 7 Venture capitalist links +8 Pro-activeness +9 Risk-taking+ 10 Work satisfactory + 11 Time availability + & & (Equation 3) where Patent grant is the predicted number of patent grants (Equation 2) and License is the predicted number of licenses (Equation 3). The above recursive models assume that the error terms ,  andare all independent.PPPPPP>PP P&       f       A  p    Research Method 0  %in-depth interview Un-structured interview with 8 faculty members survey 474 academic researchers with patent grants are surveyed. Nominal and self-reported scale are measured for the investigating variables 229 valid questionnaires through a three-wave postal survey (response rate is 48%) T//4  O  1&Dependent Variables   2'Independent Variables   JInstitutional legitimacy: IPR office subsidy, licensing income distribution, U-I cooperative project subsidy, and industrial temporary transfer Organizational resources: patenting incentive, patenting subsidy, IPR evaluation committee, IPR agent, licensing incentive, entrepreneurial fund, and incubator facility Networking resources: academic research links, industrial research links, manufacturer links, and venture capitalist links Personal resources: IPR training & education, technology transfer experience, entrepreneurial attributes, work satisfaction, and time availability dKPuf K 3(Reliabilities for Variables(  P@Nature of respondents  4)Findings  D8E:F;%Take-away points for patenting(  \IPR infrastructure Most inventors tend to rely on the assistance of the IPR offices to file patent application. Org al resources: The organizational incentive programs might not be necessary foster performance of academic patenting. Network resource: Strong research lab teamwork in terms of information collecting and brainstorming substantially enlarges the robustness of the research discoveries (Timmons, 1999). Prior experiences: IPR training and education reflects the willingness and capability of a researcher to realize their research potentials. P]PPhPPPP{P]h  x&p   G<Take-away points for licensing(  Institutional factors: The higher share (e.g., 80%) of licensing income distributed to the academic inventors and U-I cooperative project subsidy fosters academic licensing performance Network resources: Industry-academia research links lead academic research results to be closer to industrial needs (Jensen et al., 2003; Zucker et al., 1998). Personal resources: The transfer experience decreases transaction costs and makes exchange mechanisms to transfer university knowledge possible. ~{        'Take-away points for spin-offs   Institutional factors Entrepreneurial fund and incubator facility were suggested as the important impetus in fostering equity participation of academic spin-off (Di Gregorio & Shane, 2003). 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Patenting costs subsidy    @` #x <l  ?Y Druilhe and Garnsey, 2001    @` x <l  ? Patent grant incentive   @`  x <+l  ? Y  u This study       @` x <$5l  ?   t IPR agent       @` x <t>l  ? Y  u This study       @` x <Gl  ?   IPR evaluation committee    @` x <hQl  ?Y rSource   @` x <Zl  ? cItems   @`fB x 61 ?fB x 61 ?  lB x <o ? lB x <1 ? lB x <o ?YY `B  x 01 ?`B 'x 01 ?  fB Nx 61 ? lB Xx <o ?lB x <o ?lB Yx <o ?YlB Zx <1 ?fB [x 61 ?YfB ^x 61 ?`B _x 01 ?YfB bx 61 ?  `B cx 01 ? Y lB fx <1 ?  fB gx 61 ? Y lB jx <o ?  lB x <o ?  lB kx <o ? Y H x 0޽h ? fDW&cC3___PPT10i.}J+D=' = @B +L0  =|w(  | | <(j  l z(Items for Organizational Resources (2/2)))#(  Qp   =| #""E{N   | <ql  ?Cc  +Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003; Roberts, 1991 ,,+   @` | <|l  ?Cc  Equity participation/+   @` | <Єl  ?c  Entrepreneurial fund    @` | <l  ?Cc   Druilhe and Garnsey, 2001    @` | <l  ?c C  Equity participation/+   @` | <l  ?c   }Incubator facility    @`4 | <6___PPT9 xEquity participation/+ "    @`  <n  ?M r  Entrepreneurial pro-activeness   @`   <n  ? u This study       @`   <n  ?M  i Licensing/+    @`   <n  ?M  Technology transfer experience      @`    <o  ? ,Siegel and Phan, 2005; Smith and Parr, 2003 --,   @`   <\o  ?M  h Patenting/+      @`  <o  ?M  IPR training and education    @`  <#o  ?  (Lach & Schankerman, 2004; Murray, 2004 ))(   @`  <d-o  ?M  Equity participation/+   @`  <l/o  ? M  Level of time availability    @`  < @o  ?2   Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003   @`  <Ho  ?M 2   rEquity participation/-   @`  <TRo  ?2 M  $Satisfactory level of current works %%$   @`  <x[o  ? rSource   @`  < eo  ?M  ~Activity/ relation   @`  <no  ?M  w Description      @`lB  <o ?fB  61 ?fB  61 ?  lB  <o ?lB  <o ?fB  61 ?M M fB  61 ?lB  <o ?`B   01 ?`B ! 01 ?`B " 01 ?r r `B $ 01 ?2 2 H  0޽h ? fDW&cC3___PPT10i.} E+D=' = @B +L0 (  _  0Ho   Hypothesis 4: The greater the personal resources that academic patent inventors possess, the better their performance is (e.g., 4a: patenting: 4b: licensing and 4c:spin-offs).   H  0޽h ? fDW&cC3___PPT10i.})+D=' = @B +j L0 i a ) (    c $@o "`Tg   b Patent Grant& bB  :B   3 L K N  c $o "`JQ  gLicense Agreement&bB  :B  3  :   c $o "`R P  qSpin-off Equity Participation$   :B  3   X   0==l  ) #"  <o ?   Resource-based factors: (# "   @`  <o ?  T  @`  <Ho ? Institutional factors*("   @`fB  61 ?fB  61 ?`B  01 ?`B  01 ?  fB  61 ?fB  61 ? 2 & fJ  B '  >  ( Bԯo 3 jConceptual framework&F  H  0޽h ? fDW&cC3___PPT10i.}W4+D=' = @B +N L0 6(  ~  s *Ķo $7 1  o  x  c $@o $I o  H  0޽h ? fDW&cC380___PPT10.VܷB L0 *(  x  c $\o $(   o  r  S 0o $  o  H  0޽h ? fDW&cC3y___PPT10Y+D=' = @B + L0 @k(  @x @ c $o $k;   o   @ 0(o    SkNumber of patent grants the first step of academia-based research commercialization (Mowery & Ziedonis, 2002) Number of licenses the most common approach to exploiting academic research result (Powers and McDougall, 2005) Equity participation of spin-off The patent inventors retain their academic positions and share equity ownership with industrial partners ZWZZ]Z"jZ<@"h   k  H @ 0޽h ? fDW&cC3___PPT10i.B +D=' = @B + L0 D*(  Dx D c $$( t   r D S $dX  H D 0޽h ? fDW&cC3___PPT10i.B@+D=' = @B +z L0 yq 'H (  H~ H s *$o $( :  o  K  /t 'H #"&/t o  H <X? t `0.83   @`  H <8p ?  lPersonal resources   @`  H <` p ? t  `0.84   @`  H <Lp ?  nNetworking resources   @`  H <hp ? <t  `0.85   @`  H <x#p ?<  rOrganizational resources   @` H <2p ? 5t< `0.87   @` H <|5p ?5 < rInstitutional legitimacy   @` H <Dp ? /t5 | Cronbach s alpha   @` H <Y e Supported     @` D <x  ?"`g> Network res. & Patenting    @` A <x  ?"`>Y  e Supported     @` ? <x  ?"`g>  Network res. & Licensing   @` < < x  ?"`> Y  pReject   @` : <dx  ?"`g >  zNetwork res. & Spin-off Equity   @` * <lx ?> Y  s Supported      @` ) <x  ?"`g >  {Personal res. & Spin-off Equity     @` ( <x ?> Y  s Supported      @` ' <x  ?"`g >  Personal res. & Licensing   @` & <x ?> Y  s Supported      @` % <xx  ?"`g >  Personal res. & Patenting    @` $ <x ?>Y s Supported      @` # <y  ?"`g> {Org. resource & Spin-off Equity     @` " < y ?>Y pReject   @` ! < y  ?"`g> Org. resource & Licensing   @`   <y ?>Y s Supported      @`  <y  ?"`g> Org. resource & Patenting    @`  <P/y ?>Y pReject   @`  <X1y ?g> {Institutional & Spin-off Equity     @`  <t:y ?>Y e Supported     @`  <Ky ?g> Institutional & Licensing   @`  <My ?>Y e Supported     @`  <tVy ?g> Institutional & Patenting    @`  <_y ?>Y fResult   @`  <hy ?g> k Description     @`fB + 6o ?gfB , 61 ?gfB - 61 ?gfB . 61 ?gfB / 61 ?gfB 0 61 ?gfB 1 61 ?gfB 2 61 ?gfB 3 61 ? g fB 4 61 ? g fB 5 6o ? g fB 6 61 ? `B 7 01 ?>> fB 8 6o ?YY fB ; 61 ? g fB @ 61 ? g fB E 61 ?gfB M 61 ?gg fB g 6o ?gY`B h 01 ?gY`B k 01 ?gY`B n 01 ?gY`B q 01 ?gY`B t 01 ?gY`B w 01 ?gY`B z 01 ?gY`B } 01 ?gY`B  01 ?g Y `B  01 ?g Y `B  01 ?g Y `B  01 ?g Y fB  6o ?g Y H  0޽h ? fDW&cC3___PPT10i.}`c+D=' = @B + L0 *(  x  c $'y $d\  y  r  S _y $ ,  y  H  0޽h ? fDW&cC3y___PPT10Y+D=' = @B + L0  p(  r  S y $= y    s Ty 0e0e $#" 0eTt  y  H  0޽h ? fDW&cC3___PPT10i.}P)<+D=' = @B + L0  N(  r  S ܬy $? y    Hy  $m  y  H  0޽h ? fDW&cC3y___PPT10Y+D=' = @B +"L0 !(  R  C *A j0223755&F  <\y   QThank you for your attention! Dr. Yuan-Chieh Chang Email: yucchang@mx.nthu.edu.twRR&:   H  0޽h ? fDW&cC3___PPT10i.}+D=' = @B +r Ax{?%D?'D*@Ԙɠw 1@BFI70rU;!C3 y-s0  AIGK%=N0+<mYJP #<(x/ BOh+'0 px    PowerPoint ²PhilCrayons 132Microsoft PowerPoint@P5ƨ@@0qD9@i:Gg  Z  --$--'--$ s XLs --'@BComic Sans MS-. 2 Dr. Yuan  ."SystemY-@BComic Sans MS-.  2 -5.-@BComic Sans MS-. 2  Chieh Chang   .-@BComic Sans MS-.  2 15 .-p=--$ V| c V--'--$f\!--'--2$w}risrncb`WbQiUy=Yd g{--'f--$nmn--'--$ vxf--'--$fhq--'--$TgbeihkqbqWzTg--'--$||ou|--'--$Wy_rkryodWy--'--$otxvso--'f-- $S<WS--'--$ Vx`oinpqqvet]wW}Vx--'--$n||~tn--'--$lrw~}tjl--'--$tj --'--"$.;ISI916DUWO;-.--'--$ d~jiktjdbd~--'--$}wt{}}--'--6$g||w}{jmulfc  --'--$ --'--$ `NhUad]pb~lfacXdTjh`--'--$ d|knnutrm~iyd|--'--$ RvOwN|99QTZZCU~Rv--'--$ rqfmv~wv{rkrvrq--'--"$|||urrs}xzvv{|||--'p=--D$ qcZSK?&DWbl--'--D$ qK9% (/BUw--'--$--'--$Zkyq dp_Z--'--.$qFuWr~iPAw9q9p@v=I[ty{^sBqF--'--$RVR--'--8$p [ M[t--'--$--'--$--'--$a9l0.(l+^4a9--'--$\-e%| yb!X(\---'--%MT--'@Arial-. p=32 eThe determinants of academic #""2"!""2.-@Arial-. p=62 Zentrepreneurial performance in "!""""2"".-@Arial-. p=42 )~Taiwan: the institutional and #,"""!!""!.-@Arial-. p=2 kresource"".-@Arial-. p= 2 ko-5.-@Arial-. p=!2 kbased perspective"!"".-@Arial-. 2 Dr. Yuan  .-@Arial-.  2 M-5.-@Arial-. 2 \Chieh Cn!  !.-@Arial-. 2 hang/  .-sө-. 2 l iNդh,-,-,.-@Arial-. O2 &0Visiting scholar, Tsing Hua University, Beijing          .-@Arial-. Z2 NJ7Associate Professor, Institute of Technology Management            .-@Arial-. @2 v&National Tsing Hua University, Hsinchu       .-Root EntrydO) ݳPictures&Current User)SummaryInformation(:!      !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789`;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJ_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|} OngTake-away points for licensingTake-away points for spin-offs v 32  ϥΦr ²]pd vD _asemsem_KO    !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~      !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789`;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJ_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}Root EntrydO)p:Pictures&Current User#SummaryInformation(:!PowerPoint Document(DocumentSummaryInformation8/ 0DArialr Ne__2@l^T^v0l^0d^De0}fԚr Ne__2@l^T^v0l^0d^ DTimes New Romanl^T^v0l^0d^0DComic Sans MSnl^T^v0l^0d^B@DjwiԚc Sans MSnl^T^v0l^0d^APDCourier NewSnl^T^v0l^0d^1 C .  @n?" dd@  @@`` x4#25 3  (K |">$&6(*K,./|1*3579; **   ()..V5WY$$$$$$$$$b$bhſX& <AA@8NO */ ʚ;ʚ;g4BdBd^0ppp@ <4!d!d^h0_1@<4dddd^h0_1@<4BdBd^h0_1@$___PPT10De0}fԚ New __^]v0^0^DTimes New Roman^]v0^0^ DjwiԚs New Roman^]v0^0^A pp? -O =/   7,Research Outline  Introduction Research Gap and Objectives Conceptual background Institutional perspective Resource-based perspective Methods Findings Discussion & ConclusionsN@Z7Z*Z>$7*    Introduction 0   Science has emerged as an alternative engine of economic growth Universities as the engine of regional economic development Academic researchers have more freedom to exploit research outcome.   *The Previous Research  Focus on a few elite universities Ignores academic researchers who might play active role Tend to focuses on academic spin-offs Tend to be more qualitative in nature (Rothaermel et al., 2007)"@  ,!Research Question(  What do strategic factors contribute better academic entrepreneurial performance? patenting licensing and equity participation? 6S/S/  -"Institutional Perspective(  'Pursue their goals to be congruent with societal values (Scott, 1987) IPRs devolution (Mowery & Ziedonis, 2002) Many governments are operating on much tighter fiscal policies (Henderson et al., 1998) A new regime that merges academic and commercial reward systems (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2001). "(Z' ( + S&T Policy Reforms In Taiwan  Science and Technology Basic Law (1999) Subsidy Principle of Management and Promotion of Academia R&D Results (2002) Assist research institutes to establish technology transfer or liaison offices; to subsidize academic patent application and maintenance fees*uu  8."Items for Institutional Legitimacy##$"  9/ Hypothesis 1: The greater the institutional legitimacy that academic patent inventors perceive, the better their entrepreneurial performance is0Z  Resource-based view0  A broad definition of resources (Wernefelt, 1984; 1995) Organizational resources University s IPR incentive program Networking resources Researcher s relationships with other researchers, industrial partners, manufacturers, and venture capitalists Personal resources Researcher s training, experience, intelligence, and insights of the researcher8ZZ#ZZoZZPZ #o    P]  ;1<2=3>4?5@6A7C9K?recursive regression models  (  rNumber of patent grants =  +1 IPR office subsidy +2 Patenting incentive +3 Patent subsidy +4 IPR evaluation expert +5 IPR agent+6 Academic research links +7 IPR training & education + & & & & (Equation 1) Number of licenses = +1 Patent grant +2 Royalty distribution+ 3 U-I cooperative project subsidy + 4 Licensing incentive + 5 Industrial collaborative research +6 Industrial contract research+ 7 Technology transfer experience + & & & .. (Equation 2) where Patent grant is the predicted number of patent grants (from Equation 1) Number of spin-off equities = +1 Patent grant +2 License + 3 Industrial temporary transfer + 4 Campus entrepreneurial fund + 5 Incubator facility + 6 Manufacturer links+ 7 Venture capitalist links +8 Pro-activeness +9 Risk-taking+ 10 Work satisfactory + 11 Time availability + & & (Equation 3) where Patent grant is the predicted number of patent grants (Equation 2) and License is the predicted number of licenses (Equation 3). The above recursive models assume that the error terms ,  andare all independent.PPPPPP>PP P&       f       A  p    Research Method 0  %in-depth interview Un-structured interview with 8 faculty members survey 474 academic researchers with patent grants are surveyed. Nominal and self-reported scale are measured for the investigating variables 229 valid questionnaires through a three-wave postal survey (response rate is 48%) T//4  O  1&Dependent Variables   2'Independent Variables   JInstitutional legitimacy: IPR office subsidy, licensing income distribution, U-I cooperative project subsidy, and industrial temporary transfer Organizational resources: patenting incentive, patenting subsidy, IPR evaluation committee, IPR agent, licensing incentive, entrepreneurial fund, and incubator facility Networking resources: academic research links, industrial research links, manufacturer links, and venture capitalist links Personal resources: IPR training & education, technology transfer experience, entrepreneurial attributes, work satisfaction, and time availability dKPuf K 3(Reliabilities for Variables(  P@Nature of respondents  4)Findings  D8E:F;%Take-away points for patenting(  \IPR infrastructure Most inventors tend to rely on the assistance of the IPR offices to file patent application. Org al resources: The organizational incentive programs might not be necessary foster performance of academic patenting. Network resource: Strong research lab teamwork in terms of information collecting and brainstorming substantially enlarges the robustness of the research discoveries (Timmons, 1999). Prior experiences: IPR training and education reflects the willingness and capability of a researcher to realize their research potentials. P]PPhPPPP{P]h  x&p   G<Take-away points for licensing(  Institutional factors: The higher share (e.g., 80%) of licensing income distributed to the academic inventors and U-I cooperative project subsidy fosters academic licensing performance Network resources: Industry-academia research links lead academic research results to be closer to industrial needs (Jensen et al., 2003; Zucker et al., 1998). Personal resources: The transfer experience decreases transaction costs and makes exchange mechanisms to transfer university knowledge possible. ~{        'Take-away points for spin-offs   Institutional factors Entrepreneurial fund and incubator facility were suggested as the important impetus in fostering equity participation of academic spin-off (Di Gregorio & Shane, 2003). Personal resources pro-activeness and risk-taking were significant in fostering equity participation of academic spin-off (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000) Time availability for academic researchers was suggested as one of the determinantsT  I>Q L0 `X0(  f  6,O   vThe determinants of academic entrepreneurial performance in Taiwan: the institutional and resource-based perspective 0wtF(F(v  J  6uO % ) \Dr. Yuan-Chieh Chang/5_CQpgZSX Visiting scholar, Tsing Hua University, Beijing Associate Professor, Institute of Technology Management National Tsing Hua University, Hsinchu >*B B @&   H  0޽h ? fDW&cC3y___PPT10Y+D=' _= @B +rK KIP  ՜.+,0    ' pùjp NCNU  'Arial sөTimes New RomanComic Sans MSз Courier NewCrayons v 1Research Outline IntroductionThe Previous ResearchResearch QuestionInstitutional PerspectiveS&T Policy Reforms In Taiwan#Items for Institutional Legitimacy v 9Resource-based view v 11 v 12 v 13 v 14 v 15 v 16 v 17 v 18recursive regression models Research Method Dependent VariablesIndependent Variables Reliabilities for VariablesNature of respondents Findings v 26 v 27 v 28Take-away points for patenti